This study provides an empirical assessment of the efficiency and interest rate changes occurring during 61 UK retail bank mergers. Key findings of the work include the general efficiency enhancing influence of UK bank mergers and the limited effect of merger on retail interest rates. Furthermore, different banking products appear to be influenced differently by mergers. It is proposed that future assessments of bank competition and mergers require an accommodation of different types of bank customer. June 2007 JEL Classification Codes: G14, G21
Introduction
Comprehending the degree to which efficiency improvements from mergers are passed onto customers is a central concern when determining whether a merger may be legally undertaken. Further, the relationship between the efficiency and price changes which emerge from mergers is subject to much theoretical consideration (e.g. Davis and Wilson 2000 , Farrell and Shapiro 1990 , Froeb et al 2005 , Spector 2003 , Williamson 1968 . Despite this interest, relatively little empirical assessment
1 has yet to emerge directly measuring these combined dynamic price and efficiency effects of mergers. Responding to this paucity of analysis, this study provides an empirical assessment of the degree to which interest rates -the effective prices of many financial services -are influenced by horizontal retail bank mergers.
Three key findings of the study emerge. First, UK retail bank mergers between 1988
and 2004 have led to significantly enhanced cost efficiency for the merging banks.
Second, the overall level of retail interest rates for most banking services is not significantly influenced by mergers. Three, contrasting banking products and products with distinct levels of financial involvement are affected differently by mergers.
This empirical assessment develops from an academic literature which has investigated the effect of mergers on retail interest rates and efficiency separately.
Many studies have investigated the influence mergers have had on the efficiency of merged banks (see Amel et al 2004, Berger et al 1999 and Campa and Hernado, forthcoming) . While this extensive international literature indicates that the efficiency gains from bank mergers are limited, this evidence is less than conclusive. Past academic work as to performance changes arising from UK building society mergers (Barnes 1985 and Haynes and Thompson 1999) indicates both negative and positive performance effects of mergers.
Relatively few studies have considered the effects of retail bank mergers on the interest rates received by, or charged to, retail banking consumers. 2 These assessments of consumer deposit Panetta 2003, Prager and Hannan 1998) or unsecured loan (Kahn et al 2005) data have examined how merging banks and their rival banks within local markets change interest rates. This literature indicates that mergers occurring in more concentrated banking markets lead to adverse short-term deposit interest rate change (Prager and Hannan 1998) . Longer-term post-merger deposit interest rate change can also be positive due to hypothesised medium-term efficiency changes (Focarelli and Panetta 2003) . Additionally, distinct retail banking products are often affected differently by merger actions (Kahn et al 2005) , with some banking products not being influenced by merger at all.
Despite the importance of all these contributions, a persistent policy concern is the degree to which efficiency gains from mergers are passed on to bank customers. This study addresses this issue through an examination of how both retail interest rates and efficiency changed after 61 UK retail bank horizontal mergers between 1988 and
2004. This examination is undertaken in six sections. After this introduction, a brief review of the wider academic literature is included. The research setting and data used in the study are discussed in section three. Section four provides the empirical testing 2 A substantial literature has also developed assessing the effects of bank mergers for commercial rather than retail customers. Key recent contributions to this literature include Carrow et al 2006 , Focarelli et al 2002 , Karceski et al 2005 and Sapanieza 2002 framework and in section five the results of the analysis are presented. Lastly, a summary of the study is provided, conclusions are drawn and recommendations for policy makers are presented in section six.
Literature Review
This empirical investigation of efficiency and interest rate changes by merging banks contributes to the wider banking literature by addressing regulatory and theoretical concerns. These concerns are addressed in turn.
Initially, mergers between banks in many nations are subject to antitrust or competition law. 3 Within the UK legal framework mergers between banks can be blocked when they are viewed to limit competition. 4 Central to improving the competitiveness of a sector is both the achievement of efficiency or synergies from the mergers and the degree to which these efficiency savings will be passed on to customers. For example, a recent large UK bank merger between Lloyds TSB and Abbey National was expected to create substantial efficiency gains. This merger was blocked as the competition authority stated, amongst other reasons, that these efficiency gains would not be passed on to customers (Competition Commission 2001) . This decision, emphasising the pass through of efficiency gains to customers over the realisation of efficiency gains alone, is consistent with the social equity and/or consumer welfare concerns which underpin competition law within Europe and the USA (Stuyck 2005) . To summarise, an empirical understanding of how efficiency 3 Over 100 nations have now developed their own antitrust or competition laws, rules and regulations following the US model of competition law (Djelic 2002) . 4 Before the UK Enterprise Act (2002) the criteria was the public interest. A discussion of whether efficiency gains should be incorporated within a merger control regime more generally is given by Röller et al (2000) .
gains are passed on to customers after bank mergers has a substantial regulatory importance for both those wishing to merge and the regulators of such change.
Secondly, assessment of the relationship between efficiency and price changes after mergers has been the focus of much theoretical examination. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) assert that prices will only fall after a merger if substantially lower marginal costs exist relative to the marginal costs of the two merging firms before the merger.
Conversely if a merger generates no efficiencies (synergies) then prices faced by customers will rise. Within this framework a profitable merger will only be socially beneficial in a limited number of cases where efficiency has risen substantially and this benefit has been passed on to consumers. Thus the relationship between efficiency and price change should be positive when interest rates represent a benefit to the customer, as is the case for deposits, and negative when they represent a cost to the customers, as is the case for lending.
This contribution has led to a range of theoretical developments. In assessing the link between pricing, efficiency and competition, Davis and Wilson (2000) indicate that the initial efficiency levels of the merging firms have a substantial influence on the level of competition engendered by the merged firm. As a result the degree of pass through of efficiency after mergers may be influenced by the initial efficiency endowment of the merging firms. Further contributions from Bulow and Pfleiderer (1985) and Ten Kate and Niels (2005) emphasise the limited influence that price elasticity of demand or market share imposes on the degree of efficiency gains passed on to the consumer in different competition forms. This last position indicates the market structure often has a negligible influence on the pass through of efficiency gains. From this literature, three hypotheses can be defined and subsequently tested:
o Bank mergers will generally result in adverse conditions for consumers if a merger has no efficiency gains.
o Relative price improvements for customers will occur only when substantial efficiency gains are recorded after a merger event.
o The duration over which efficiency and interest rates change after mergers have occurred can be substantial and different banking products may be affected by bank mergers in different ways.
The approaches through which these hypotheses are empirically assessed are examined in the next section.
Research Setting and Data

Research Setting
The assessment of the research hypotheses is undertaken in the setting of the UK have not been subject to this process due their relatively small scale.
Data used in the study
The data for this study comes from three sources. The deposit interest rate data are provided for instant access accounts and notice accounts. These two deposit products are issued by 104 banks, for 3 different deposit values ranging from small (£500), medium (£5,000) and large (£50,000) deposits.
These values are chosen as they are distinct and do not overlap due to the effect of inflation. The mortgage data are the reference interest rates from which the interest charged on different mortgage contracts for existing mortgage customers is assessed.
These data are provided for 99 banks in total. The unsecured personal lending data are provided at three levels of lending for relatively small (£1,000), medium (£5,000) and large quantities (£10,000). These data are recorded for 52 banks in total. All the interest rate data are provided at monthly intervals over an 18 year period from 1988 to 2004, providing 162,972 observations for deposits, 14,455 observations for mortgages and 4,249 observations for unsecured lending. The product data are pooled for different product characteristics and forms of distribution.
The Testing Framework
Two approaches are employed to test for the effects of bank merger on interest rates and cost efficiency. First, the cost efficiency of both merging and non-merging banks is calculated. Second, a regression model is estimated to ascertain the link between interest rates and merger events for all the banks in our sample. These procedures are discussed in turn.
Efficiency Estimation
The level of bank-specific annual cost efficiency is estimated using a stochastic (Charnes et al 1978 , Banker et al 1984 due to the stochastic form of the frontier estimated. Cost efficiency is estimated in this study, rather than alternative efficiency measures such as profit efficiency (see Berger and Humphrey 1997) , as the sample of banks have a variety of objective functions. For example while retail banks may be assumed to be profit-maximising institutions, mutuallyowned building societies may be maximising a range of alternative objectives (see Drake and Llewellyn 2001 and Nichols 1967) .
7 Efficiency was also estimated using this DEA approach. Whilst the findings were broadly similar to the estimates recorded here, this approach was viewed to be less able to accommodate a diverse range of productive technologies and subsequently is not reported in this study. Within the efficiency model total costs include both the bank's operating and financial costs following an intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley 1977) . Outputs are quantified by their value. The price of labour (P 1 ) is proxied by the total wage bill divided by the number of full time equivalent employees. The price of capital (P 2 ) is represented by the total capital expenses including depreciation costs, divided by total fixed assets. The price of deposits (P 3 ) is represented by total interest payable divided by the quantity of deposits. These definitions of inputs and outputs are broadly consistent with other European and UK studies of bank efficiency (e.g. Altunbas et al 1997 , Ashton 2001a , Casu and Girardone 2006 . Descriptive statistics adjusted for 2004 prices 8 of these data are provided in Table 1 .
The procedure for estimating the model follows the general frontier cost function proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) . This stochastic frontier, estimated using panel data can be represented as:
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and represented as (2) in logarithmic form:
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where: C it represents a scalar cost of i th bank in the t th period; and f denotes a functional form. P ijt is a vector of the j th input price used by i th bank in the t th period;
Y igt is a vector of i th bank's output in the t th period. The error term V it assumed to be independently and identically distributed represents the effect of random shocks (noise) and is independent of U it , the inefficiency term which represents technical inefficiencies. Following the Battese-Coelli (1992) parameterisation of time effects, the technical inefficiency term is assumed to have a truncated-normal distribution.
After estimating a particular cost function using a maximum likelihood estimator, the individual cost efficiency for bank i th in the t th period relative to cost frontier is estimated according to the ratio between the minimum cost (C min ) necessary to produce that bank's output and the actual cost (C i ), such as:
The productive technology in this model is represented by a flexible Fourier functional form (see Gallant 1981 Gallant , 1982 . The flexible Fourier functional form is a second order polynomial with a combination of sine and cosine functions in the explanatory variables. This form is Sobelev flexible form, estimates elasticities consistently and reduces specification bias when representing diverse productive technologies (Gallant 1981 , 1982 , Ivaldi et al 1996 .
The method for defining variables follows the approach established by Mitchell and Onvural (1996) . The trigonometric transformations of the variables are functions that re-scale the periodic sine and cosine values so that they fall within a sample-specific domain of (0, 2π). Chalfant and Gallant (1985) and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) indicate that the semi-non-parametric sample-specific scaling procedure may be simplified through the imposition of a number of a priori assumptions allowing the flexible Fourier series expansion to be used as an effective expansion technique (Rossi 1985) . The non-parametric sample-specific scaling procedure employed is denoted:
p r min , p r max = sample minimum/maximum for the r th input price y j min , y j max = sample minimum/maximum for the j th output quantity Linear homogeneity is imposed through the use of opposite signs in the input price vectors and imposing the restriction that parameters of the input price vector sum to zero (Mitchell and Onvural 1996) . Monotonicity and quasi-concavity in input prices are not imposed due to the semi-non-parametric (non-multiplicative) technique underlying the flexible Fourier functional form. 9 The coefficient estimates for the cost model are reported in Appendix 2. The values of the inefficiency scores can be interpreted as follows: an efficiency score of 1.11 means that the bank's costs are 11%
higher than the costs of an equivalent bank that is efficient.
The relationship between interest rates and merger
A time series, cross-sectional regression model is employed to consider the effect of merger on the level of interest rate change. The continuously compounded rate of interest is assessed following an approach suggested by Kim and Singal (1993) , Prager and Hannan (1998) and Kahn et al (2005) . 10 For the different banking services considered the following equation (5) 10 This examination of interest rate change does not use econometric time series techniques such as cointegration to quantify the speed of interest rate changes. These statistical techniques are not employed as product-specific retail interest rate data displays a substantial degree of clustering, around certain digits and factions (see Hudson 2006, Kahn et al 1999) . The non-random and discrete data characteristics associated with data clustering are inconsistent with co-integration methods, which depend on random and continuous data for non-biased estimation. target (T) banks, and in the 72 months after the merger event for acquiring (A) banks.
These time periods where chosen arbitrarily yet are informed by past evidence (Focarelli and Panetta 2003) which recorded that interest rate changes from mergers can develop over substantial periods of time. In total 97 monthly variables for acquiring banks and 24 variables for target banks are estimated. ε it is a non-zero error term. Following Prager and Hannan (1998) the model is estimated using an OLS estimator with Huber-White robust standard errors. This approach is adopted to overcome the potential problem of similar levels of interest rate change being reported for different banks in repeated time periods. These models are estimated for both distinct banking products and different levels of financial involvement by customers. 
Results
The assessment of cost efficiency and bank-specific characteristics for merging and non-merging banks is displayed in Table 3 . The pertinent findings considering the pre-merger, intermediate, long-term and total effects of merger on interest rates are displayed in Table 4 for all banks. Due to space constraints the regression coefficient values for the interest rate models are not reported and are available on request from the corresponding author. Table 3 reports the frequency of UK bank mergers, the average levels of bank efficiency for each year, and the average levels of cost efficiency, for merging and non-merging banks. Within this table it is identified that most UK bank mergers occurred in the first half of the sample period. Further, the average level of interest paid or payable on three representative banking services and quantities are reported.
Cost Efficiency and Bank Characteristics
These rates display a strong decline across the sample period, making meaningful comparisons of interest rates at different time periods problematic. Overall, the level of bank efficiency averages 1.17 indicating a 17% efficiency difference exists between the average efficiency bank and a bank with best practice efficiency characteristics. The relative level of dispersion in the level of efficiency remains fairly constant in most years. Overall the merging banks are viewed to have higher levels of cost efficiency over the entire sample period and acquiring banks are seen to have higher cost efficiency than target banks.
Within the lower panel of Table 3 differences between bank-specific variables and efficiency for merging and non-merging banks are recorded five years before and after mergers for target and acquiring banks respectively. Acquiring banks have a statistically significant higher average level of efficiency, which improves in the years after the merger event. This finding is consistent with both previous empirical evidence (Haynes and Thompson 1999) and with past regulatory assessments (e.g.
Competition Commission 2001) which have emphasised the efficiency enhancing potential of UK bank mergers. This efficiency profile is also representative of merging banks appreciating longer-term efficiency gains in the manner predicted by Focarelli and Panetta (2003) . For target banks efficiency improvement is observed prior to merger, with target banks on average having lower levels of average efficiency than acquiring banks.
Regression Model Findings
The regression models reported in Table 4 are estimated for all banks and provide an indication as to the effect of merger events on the pricing of banking products. The model fit for the regression models using deposits and mortgage data is far more robust than that observed for unsecured loans; probably a result of the lower level of significant coefficient estimates obtained for this model and the smaller number of observations considered for unsecured loans. For most models the restrictions imposed are significant, and relatively high values of the coefficient of determination are recorded relative to those reported by Prager and Hannan (1998) and Kahn et al (2005) .
The strongest finding from this assessment is that for most banking services, including instant access deposits, mortgage lending and unsecured lending, the effect of merger events on interest rate setting is not significantly different from zero. This finding is consistent both before mergers, in the immediate zero to two year merger period and up to and including six years after the merger.
The effect of merger on notice deposit accounts in contrast to the other banking products does appear to be statistically significant. For larger quantities (£5,000 and £50,000) invested in notice deposit accounts, a consistent negative change in the interest rates received by customers is recorded. This reduction in the level of interest received by these customers occurs both immediately after the merger event and up to six years after the merger event. In total the effect of this change on notice deposit interest rates can be interpreted as a major decline in the level of interest received by customers relative to non-merging banks. Clearly, this provides strong evidence that merging banks compete far less aggressively in the market for notice deposits.
Conversely, before mergers, target banks appear to be pricing their notice deposit account for smaller quantities (£500 and £5000) relatively aggressively and providing significantly higher rates of interest in the two years before the merger occurs.
Overall, we suggest that the process of merger appears to be associated with a strategic change away from the competitive provision of notice deposits. 
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Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
This study quantifies the influence of mergers on the level of interest payable on retail deposits and loans, and cost efficiency for UK banks. Initially, UK bank mergers are seen to be cost efficiency enhancing. This finding is consistent with past work of Haynes and Thompson (1991) and indicates that the time over which efficiency gains are realised is substantial, with statistically significant efficiency gains appreciated even five years after the merger event.
The effect of bank mergers on retail interest rates is mostly statistically insignificant.
This finding is in many regards at odds with findings reported for the US (Prager and Hannan 1998) or Italian (Focarelli and Panetta 2003) banking markets, where mergers are seen to have a stronger and negative influence on interest rates. This difference may exist for many reasons, including differences in the market structure of the banking markets considered. This study, distinct from past work, considers a large, and in many regards national, banking market (see Ashton 2001b) , as opposed to relatively small regional markets. It is also possible that the influence of bank mergers over market power may be far more limited in larger national markets.
The findings for efficiency and interest rates are broadly consistent with the theoretical framework proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) . These authors indicated that large changes in efficiency are required to overcome price rising effects of mergers. The situation where interest rates are in many cases unmoved by moderate efficiency improvements as observed in this study is consistent with this perspective.
To conclude, this study assesses the combined efficiency and price effects which follow banks mergers. It is reported that the degree of pass through from efficiency gains to prices is both limited and varies by product type. These findings contrast with contemporary approaches to assessing the impact of mergers through a proxy such as market share (see Werden 2002) . It is proposed that the price and efficiency effects which emerge from mergers may not be clearly understood through assessment of market share change alone. Further, future work assessing the impact of mergers may choose to investigate possible differential pricing and efficiency effects which develop from the merger process. Number of Parameters = 65 * indicates statistical significance at 10 %, ** indicates significance at 1%.
